Huse: Boards, Governance and Value Creation

Olen innostunut lukemaan hallitustyöskentelykirjallisuutta oikein urakalla. Tällä kertaa käsittelyyn pääsee Morten Husen Boards, Governance and Value Creation.

Morten Huse: Boards, Governance and Value Creation

Morten Huse ja humaani corporate governance

Morten Huse on norjalainen professori, joka on keskittynyt tutkimaan hallitustyöskentelyä ja corporate governancea. Yksi Husen viimeaikaisista erityisaiheista on ollut naisten osuuden nostaminen yritysten hallituksissa. Hänen tutkimustyöllään lienee ollut keskeinen vaikutus siihen, että Norjassa otettiin käyttöön 40%:n sukupuolikiintiöt ja Norjaa käytetään täten aina esimerkkinä alan tutkimuksissa. 

Morten on mukava mies. Olen osallistunut useampaan hänen järjestämään tutkimus- ja hallitustyöseminaariin, joten ajatukset ovat alkaneet tulla tutuksi. Meillä on selkeitä näkemyseroja, koska itse painotan enemmän omistaja- ja rahoitusmarkkinalähtöistä ajattelua Mortenin korostaman sidosryhmätasapainon sijasta, mutta silti arvostan hänen ajatuksiaan ja luentojaan. Morten kritisoi amerikkalaista lähestymistapaa hallitustyöskentelyyn ja corporate governanceen, erityisesti vallitsevaa agenttiteoriaa, ja painottaa mielummin eurooppalaista tutkimustyyliä eli pehmeämpää, käyttäytymistieteisiin perustuvaa lähestymistapaa. Mortenilla on myös hauska konsepti, boards and wine, hallitustyö ja viinit, eli keskustelutilaisuudet hallitustyöskentelystä kutsutulla joukolla hyvien viinien ääressä. Suomalainen versio voisi olla Boards and Beer eli vapaamuotoisemmat hallitusharrastajien kokemusten vaihdot oluen kera.

Boards, Governance and Value Creation - tutkimuslähtöinen hallituskirja

Boards, Governance and Value Creation on toinen Husen englanniksi kirjoittamista pääteoksista. Tämä on hänen oma tuotos, toinen on kokoomateos. Boards, Governance and Value Creation on tutkimuslähtöinen kirja hallitustyöskentelystä. Siinä pyritään esittelemään, miten akateemisessa maailmassa on käsitelty hallitustyöskentelyä. Se esittelee kattavasti eri teoriat, joita näissä tutkimuksissa on käytetty ja täten luo hallitustyöskentelylle teoreettisen viitekehyksen. Tässä tavoitteessaan kirja toimii hyvin. Jos siis harrastaa hallitustyön tutkimusta, on Husen teos erinomainen koontiteos aiempiin tutkimuksiin ja hyvän lähdeluettelon myötä oiva johdanto-opus alkuperäisiin teksteihin. 

Käytännön hallitustyöskentelyn kannalta kirja jää irralliseksi. Uskon, että moni hallitusammattilainen tuskastuisi tätä kirjaa lukiessaan ja pistäisi tämän kirjan laariin "akateemikot eivät tiedä käytännöstä mitään". Kirjasta paistaa läpi, ettei Husen oma kokemus hallitustyöskentelystä ole erityisen kattava. Siispä suosittelen kirjaa lähinnä hallitusajattelussaan akatemian puolelle hurahtaneille semitieteilijöille, muita kannustan hakemaan käytännöllisempiä oppaita. Tiedän, että opusta käytetään yliopistoissa corporate governance-kursseilla hallitustyöskentelyn oppikirjana, mutta siinäkin tarkoituksessa se ei valitettavasti ole oikein soveltuva. Jos opiskelija muodostaa tämän kirjan pohjalta käsityksen hallitustyöskentelystä, on kuilu käytäntöön turhan suuri. 

Ja jotta ei jäisi liian negatiivinen kuva kirjasta, totean siis vielä, että kirja on omassa lajissaan harvinainen ja hyvä. Paljon siitä saa poimintoja, alla vain murto-osa muistiinpanoistani. Ihmiselle, joka tuntee sekä hallitustyöskentelyn akateemisen tutkimusmaailman että aidon käytännön, kirja jäsentää omaa ajattelua, käsitteellistää ilmiöitä ja kytkee teorioita sekä viitekehyksiä käytännön tilanteisiin.

Poiminnot

• A typology of board tasks: 1) Board output control task, 2) Board networking task, 3) Board internal control task, 4) Board advisory task, 5) Board decision control task, 6) Board collaboration and mentoring task. (40)
• Value creation theories combine strategies and resources. (61)
• A resource-based view of the firm will view the board as a firm-internal resource of competitive advantage. (62)
• Board theories: aunt theories - formal tasks; barbarian theories - external perspectives and incentives; clan theories - institutional perspectives and norms; and value-creating theories - strategies and resources. (65)
• Board Capital concept was introduced by Amy Hillman and Thomas Dalziel who combined agency and resource theories. They define board capital as the human capital and the relational capital of the board members. The human capital is the experience, expertise, reputation, etc of the board members. The relation capital is the social ties to other firms and external contingencies. (73)
• Board competencies are 1) firm-specific knowledge, 2) general business and functional knowledge, 3) board process knowledge, 4) relational knowledge, 5) competence related to personality, 6) negotiation skills, 7) ownership skills. (74)
• In most firms shareholders want to be board members themselves. The main qualification will thus be ownership. (76)
• There are at least three main board composition dimensions. These are concerned with independence, competence and processes. Board composition is, however, broader than just a proper mix of outside and inside directors. The board composition question is mainly related to finding a proper balance between involvement and distance. It is a question about dependence versus independence. It is also about finding proper balances of competence. Finally, board composition is about finding a group of people who can work together. (82)
• There are variety of reasons that people have for being or wanting to be a board member. The main reason is, clearly, that of ownership. Those investing in a firm want to become board members to make sure that their investments are properly taken care of. Other major reasons are a desire for power, the possibility of gaining influence, prestige, the potential for learning, increased possibilities in the labour market and the ability to develop networks. (88)
• Various theories may be helpful in explaining the board member selection process. These theories include decision-making theories, signalling theory, tournament theory, similarity attracts theory and social network theory. These theories can also provide guidance on how to become a board member. Agency theory can also be included in this list, as ownership or representing ownership is definately the most important reason for becoming a board member. (89)
• It is important to signal interest in board position (signalling theory), to gain experience from boards in less prestigious organisations (tournament theory), find mentors (similarity attracts theory) and be involved in the social and professional network (social network theory) of those influencing board decisions. Board members will often be included in a net of interlocking directorates. Novices who perform well on one board will therefore find it easier to make a smooth transition to other boards. (89)
• To be a board member is not only a matter of the total hours spent on the board. It is also a question of when these hours are spent, and it requires the flexibility to spend the necessity time on board work when it is urgent. It is, therefore, not just a matter of summing the numbers of hours expected to be spent on each board. Sometimes board work requires meetings and other kinds of work at very irregular hours, at certain places at certain times. To be a board member sets major demands on availability and flexibility. (90)
• Checklist for those considering board membership: the regulations of the firm; the expectations the shareholders and other important stakeholders have of the board; the working style of the board, including formal and informal structures; the other board members; potential conflicts of interest the applicant may have, and whether they are acceptable to the other board members; protocols from earlier board meetings, and in particular if there are earlier decisions that will bind the board and the firm in a way that is not desired; the annual reports and results; the quality of board preparations; the monetary and non-monetary renumeration; and the existence of board liability insurance. (91)
• Industrialists, restructurers, institutional owners and portfolio managers are examples of different ownership types. (121)
• Boards are the locus of control processes. (162)
• Board membership is often in itself a motivation to serve on boards. (179)
• It is the task of the chair to provide effective board leadership, and thus also to be a team leader and to ensure that the characteristics of an effective team are present. This includes the board culture; the board culture provides the context in which the board functions. The board chair sets the tone for much more than board meetings. The chair orchestrates board self-development and evaluations. And engaged chair leads to an engaged board. (200)
• Taxonomy of chairpersons: the pliant; the my way; the in the weeds detail; the no leadership ability or interest; the self-serving; and the procrastinating chairperson. (by Richard and Lana Furr, 200)
• A good board chairperson is a coach. (201)
• The chairperson must never forget that the people on the board are his or her peers, each with valuable insights and talents to contribute. The board chairperson assumes additional responsibilities, not greater authority. (201)
• Good board chairperson share a number of core qualities and experiences: An impressive track record and a wide network of contacts; experience as an executive and a non-executive director; personal presence and high standards of personal integrity; intelligence and the ability to think strategically. (202)
• A good chairperson works well with the CEO, achieves openness and transparency at board meetings, continuosly improves board performance and has an open leadership style. A good chairperson counsels and challenges the CEO in a collaborative rather than confrontational way. A good chairperson has interpersonal and leadership skills and the ability to communicate effectively, Empathy and self-awareness are more and more critical; arrogance is a debilitating barrier. Great chairpersons demonstrate leadership that inspires and excites enthusiasm. (202)
• It is of little value to have skilled and knowledgeable persons on a board if they do not use these skills and knowledge. (218)
• The board members who turned up poorly prepared - or even completely unprepared - were often executives with a high reputation, and they often had many board assignments. (221)
• The duty of the board is not only to protect wealth but also to create wealth. (272)
• The duty of boards include balancing the distribution of value to the various stakeholders. (273)
• Board member types: liaison facilitators and resource providers; consultants, supporters and advisers; mentors and collaborators; decision-makers and analysts; evaluators and controllers; and negotiators and advocates. (288)