Teos Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment ei taatusti tarttuisi kirjakaupasta ostoskoriin, ellei sattuisi olemaan hurahtanut yrittäjyyden ja omistajuuden tieteellisiin teorioihin. Teos on tyyliltään akateeminen ja suunnattu osaksi akateemista keskustelua, joten ilman aihepiirin aiempaa syvällistä tuntemusta kirja tuskin kolahtaa. Minulle se kyllä osui ja upposi. Niin kovasti, että teos tulee olemaan monilta osin viitekehykseltään keskeisessä roolissa myös tulevassa väitöskirjassani. Teoksessaan Foss ja Klein pyrkivät ensisijaisesti kehittämään yrittäjämäistä yritysteoriaa (entrepreneurial theory of the firm). Heidän ajattelussaan ja teoriassaan yrittäjyys asettuu taloudellisen toiminnan keskiöön ja yrityksiä, markkinataloutta ja siten taloutta on mahdotonta selittää ilman ymmärrystä yrittäjyydestä.
Kirja esittelee kiitettävästi aiemmat yrittäjyyden teoriat. Esille nousevat erityisesti Schumpeter, Kirzner ja itävaltalaisen koulukunnan von Mises sekä Rothbard. Kirjoittajat nostavat myös esiin yrittäjyyden ymmärryksen puutteellisuuden vallitsevissa talousteorioissa. Erityisesti makrotaloustieteen malleissa yrittäjyydelle ei useinkaan jää selittävää sijaa. Kuitenkin kirjoittajat osoittavat, että markkinatalous on mahdotonta ilman yrittäjyyttä.
Yrittäjyyden teorioissa minua omistajuuden tutkijana kiinnostaa erityisesti yrittäjyyden suhde omistajuuteen. Edellyttääkö yrittäjyys omistajuutta? Onko yrittäjyys omistajuuden isä? Synnyttääkö yrittäjyys omistajuuden? Onko omistajuutta olemassa ilman yrittäjyyttä? Tylsä, mutta teoreettinen vastaus näihin kysymyksiin kuuluu, että riippuu yrittäjyyden määritelmästä. Jos määrittelee yrittäjyyden kirzneriläisittäin eli "idealistiksi/näkemyksen ottajaksi", ei yrittäjyys edellytä omistajuutta. Tällöin yrittäjyys on irrallaan resurssien omistamisesta eli kapitalistin roolista. Muut sen sijaan kytkevät yrittäjyyden ja omistajuuden kiinteästi toisiinsa. Näin myös Foss ja Klein, joiden mukaan yrittäjyys on pohjimmiltaan päätöstä resurssien käyttämisestä yrittäjien näkemyksen mukaisella parhaalla yhdistelmällä. Yrittäjyys on siis sekä ideointia että resurssien yhdistämistä ja allokointia (s.21). Luonteeltaan yrittäjyys on opportunismia ja arbitraasia, koska yrittäjän on määritelmän mukaisesti aina otettava eriävä näkemys markkinoiden vallitsevasta näkemyksestä ja kuljettava oma polkunsa (s.34).
Kirjan vahva perusnäkemys on pääoman heterogeenisyys. Eri resursseilla on eri arvo ja hinta ja yrittäjyysprosessin tehtävänä on saattaa resurssit parhaaseen mahdolliseen käyttöön, jotta niiden arvo saadaan maksimoitua (s.104). Kirjassa käsitellään hyvin vallitsevia teorioita ja niiden puutteellisuuksia nimenomaan pääoman heterogeenisyyden sekä informaation epäsymmetrisyyden näkökulmasta. Täten tulee osoitetuksi, kuinka vähän moni yleinenkin teoria ymmärtää loppujen lopuksi markkinatalouden ydinoletuksista. Esimerkiksi jos sopimukset olisivat täydellisiä, ei olisi tarvetta omistajuudelle eikä myöskään yrityksille, koska kaikki omaisuuserien ominaisuudet (attribuutit) olisi hankittavissa sopimusteitse. Näin ei kuitenkaan todellisuudessa ole, eikä voi teoriassa eikä käytännössä ollakaan. Siksi omistajuutta resurssin viimeisenä vastuunkantajana tulee aina esiintymään markkinataloudessa.
The theory
of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm should be treated together. (1)
An easy way
to delineating different types of entrepreneurs and economic theories of
entrepreneurship is to distinguish between those that define entrepreneurship
as an outcome or a phenomenon (e.g. self-employment, start-ups) and those that
see entrepreneurship as a way of thinking or acting (e.g. creativity,
innovation, alertness, judgment, adaptation). 7
“Entrepreneurial
talent is really a portmanteau variable that includes entrepreneurial,
managerial and ownership skills.” – Lucas (1978), 9
Since Coase
(1937) the fundamental issues in the economic theory of the firm have been
taken as why firms exist (when non-firm, contractual means of allocating
resources are available), what determinates their boundaries (i.e., the
allocation of productive activities across firms), and what determines their
internal organization (i.e., organization structure, reward systems, etc.) 12
“The
theoretical firm is entrepreneurless – The Prince of Denmark has been expunged
from the discussion of Hamlet” – (Baumol, 1968, 68), 12
Entrepreneurship
is not simply another resource, like physical and financial capital,
reputation, human capital, technical know-how, and the like, but a
higher-level, coordinating factor – the source of what we call “primary or
original judgment”. 14
Entrepreneurs
differ in their abilities to exercise original judgment and to delegate
“derived judgment” to subordinates. 14
The ability
to organize resources is itself a capability, an ability to create and
recognize strategic opportunities. – Denrell et al (2003) 15
Schumpeter
is without any doubt the best-known economics contributor to the
entrepreneurship field. 16
Kirzner’s
entrepreneurs do not own capital, they need only be alert to profit
opportunities. Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. 18
Opportunities
for entrepreneurial gain do not exist, objectively, waiting to be discovered
and exploited; rather, opportunities come into existence only as they are
manifested in action. 20
The concept
of entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-making under uncertainty, a concept
we trace through Cantillon (1755), Say (1803), Knight (1921) and Mises (1949).
Entrepreneurs are modeled as decision-makers who invest resources based on
their judgment of future market conditions, investments that may or may not
yield positive return. Because markets for judgment are closed, the exercise of
judgment requires starting a firm; moreover, judgment implies asset ownership.
…There is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore
exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to own productive assets.
…Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making is
ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources. (20-21)
Resource
uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using
assets to produce goods. The entrepreneur’s decision problem is aggravated by
the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not immediately
obvious how they should be combined. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to
arrange or organize the capital goods he owns. (21)
We are
living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations … will be
ever changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the
real function of entrepreneur.” – Ludwig Lachmann, (1956, 16), 21
One way to
operationalize the Austrian notion of
heterogeneity is to incorporate Barzel’s (1997) idea that capital goods are
distinguished by their attributes. Attributes are characteristics, functions,
or possible use of assets, as perceived by an entrepreneur. Assets are
heterogeneous to the extent that they have different, and different levels of,
valued attributes. Attributes may also vary over time, even for a particular
asset. Given Knightian uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to know all
relevant attributes of assets when production decisions are made. Nor can the
future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with
certainty. (22)
Entrepreneurs
who seek to create or discover new attributes or capital assets will want
ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for
reasons of economizing on transaction costs. (22)
If any firm
can do what any other firm does (Demsetz, 1991), if all firms are always on
their production possibility frontier, and if firms always make their
equilibrium choices of input combinations and output levels, then there is no
room for entrepreneurship. 26
Because
capital is heterogeneous, the attributes of capital goods are not always known,
ex ante. 27
Entrepreneur’s
primary role is to exercise judgment about the use of productive resources
under uncertainty. 28
Schumpeter
carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and strongly
criticized the neoclassic economists for confusing the two). His entrepreneur
need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at
all. 32
Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its environment, the nature and
structure of the firm does not affect the level of entrepreneurship. 33
For
Kirzner, recognition is the primary entrepreneurial act; the rest is
management. Kirzner’s formulation emphasizes the nature of competition as what
Hayek (1968) called a “discovery process”. The source of entrepreneurial profit
is superior foresight – the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving
technology) unknown to other market participants. The simplest case is that of
the financial-market or commodity arbitrageur, who discovers a discrepancy in
present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical
case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product of a superior production
process and steps in to fill market gap before others. Success, in this view,
comes not from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having
some knowledge or insight that no one else has – that is, from something beyond
the given means-end framework. 34
Kirzner’s
entrepreneurs do not own capital: they need only to be alert to profit
opportunities. Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. The worst
that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an existing
profit opportunity. Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not need a firm to exercise
their function in the economy. 34
According
to Rothbard (1985, 283) “Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor
games until the money is obtained and committed to the projects.” 34
According
to Klein (2008b) “Under uncertainty, opportunities can only be defined ex post.
Action, not opportunities, should be the unit of analysis in entrepreneurship
studies”. 35
“Both the
Spanish word “empresa” and the French and Latin expression “entrepreneur”
derive etymologically from the Latin verb in prehendo-endi-ensum, which means
to discover, to see, to perceive, to realize, to attain; and the Latin term in
prehensa clearly implies action and means to take, to catch, to seize. In
short, empresa is synonymous with action”. 35
Making
decisions without knowing the consequences for sure – is the entrepreneur’s
raison d’être. Of course, all human action involves uncertainty, such that
there is an element of entrepreneurship in all human behavior. 39
While
alertness tends to be passive, judgment is active. Alertness is the ability to
react to existing opportunities while judgment refers to the creation of new
opportunities. Entrepreneurs are those who seek to profit by actively promoting
adjustment to change. 39
Judgment
implies asset ownership. Judgmental decision-making is ultimately
decision-making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur without
capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur. The firm, in this sense,
is the entrepreneur and the assets he owns, and therefore ultimately controls.
The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of how the entrepreneurs exercises
his judgmental decision-making – what combinations of assets will he seek to
acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will
he provide incentives and employ monitoring to see that his assets are used
consistently with his judgment, and so on. 40
In the
marginal productivity theory, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest,
and owners of specific factors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s
realized receipts over these factor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit
and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical
equilibrium without uncertainty, capitalists would still earn interest, as a
reward of lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 40
Entrepreneurship,
and not labor or management or technological expertise, is the crucial element
of the market economy. In the absence of entrepreneurship a complex, dynamic
economy cannot allocate resources to their highest valued use. 41
Firms are
bundles of resources, and an entrepreneurial theory of the firm must be a
theory about resources. 42
The
entrepreneur is described by Menger (1871, 68) as a coordinating agent who is
both capitalist and a manager. Menger also makes the entrepreneur a resource
owner, as does Knight (1921) 46
“Entrepreneurs
work for uncertain wages, and all others for certain wages. …Even Beggars and
Robbers are Entrepreneurs of this class” –Cantillon (1755)
Fetter’s
(1905, 286-287) description of the entrepreneur identifies uncertainty-bearing
as the key entrepreneurial function. The entrepreneur (1) “guarantees to the
capitalist-lender a fixed return, (2) gives up the certain income to be got by
lending his own capital, and becoming a borrower, offers his capital as
insurance to the lender, (3) gives to other workers a definite amount for
services applied to distant ends and (4) risks his own services and accepts an
indefinite chance instead of a definite amount for them”. He also serves as an
“organizer” and “director”, possessing unusual foresight and the ability to
judge men and tact in relations with them. In short, the entrepreneur “is the
economic buffer; economic forces are transmitted through him”. 49
Wieser
(1914) presents entrepreneur as owner, manager, leader, innovator, organizer
and speculator. 50
“If Kirznerian
entrepreneur owns no assets, then how in the world does he earn profits?
Profits, after all, are simply the other side of the coin of an increase in the
value of one’s capital; losses are the reflection of a loss in capital assets.
The speculator who expects a stock to rise uses money to purchase that stock; a
rise or fall in the price of stock will raise or lower the value of the stock
assets. If the price rises, the profits are one and the same thing as the
increase in capital assets. The process is more complex but similar in the
purchase or hiring of factors of production, the creating of a product and then
its sale on the market. In what sense can an entrepreneur ever make profits if
he owns no capital to make profits on?” – Rothbard (1985,282-3) 55
“Ownership
and entrepreneurship are to be viewed as completely separate functions. Once we
have adopted the convention of concentrating all elements of entrepreneurship
into the hands of pure entrepreneurs, we have automatically excluded the asset
owner from an entrepreneurial role. Purely entrepreneurial decisions are by
definition reserved to decision-makers who own nothing at all. – Kirzner
(1973,47) 58
Kirzner
claims that entrepreneurship is a logical category. 60
Mises’s
entrepreneur is a resource allocator. 65
Judgment is
residual, controlling decision-making about resources deployed to achieve some
objectives; it is manifest in the actions of individual entrepreneurs; and it
cannot be bought and sold on the market, such that its exercise requires the
entrepreneur who own and control a firm. 78
Entrepreneurship
can be neither taught nor learned. – Mises (1949, 585) 80
Judgment is
rooted in skills for handling uncertainty. Judgment is a function. It is based
on perceptions, skills and heuristics. 81
Profit is
the reward to bearing uncertainty, specially a return that accrues to those
entrepreneurs who are particularly optimistic in the face of ambiguity and who
succeed with their entrepreneurial ventures. 96
Firm is a
nested hierarchy of judgment. 98
In the
market economy, there will always be entrepreneurs. As long as there is private
ownership, markets, and prices, there is entrepreneurship. 99
Opportunities
for entrepreneurial gain are inherently subjective, in the sense that they do
not exist until profits are realized. 102
Modern
economics does not really have a theory of capital per se. It may have various
theories of investments and interest, but not a theory of capital in the sense
of the classical or the Austrian economists (Lewin, 1999, Garrison, 2001)
Similarly, modern management theory is not explicitly founded upon, or even
related to, any particular theory of capital. 106
Austrian
Capital Theory consists of Menger (1871), Böhm-Bawerk (1884-1912), Hayek
(1941), Mises (1949), Lachmann (1956), Kirzner (1967) and Lewin (1999). 106
The shmoo
capital is close to being a substitute for a zero-transaction-cost assumption.
While transaction costs would not disappear entirely in such world, asset
ownership would be relatively unimportant. The possibility of specifying all
possible uses of an asset significantly reduces the costs of writing complete,
contingent contracts between resource owners and entrepreneurs governing the
uses of the relevant assets. Contracts would be largely substitute for
ownership, leaving the boundary of the firm indeterminate. Similarly, in a
world of shmoo capital the entrepreneur is relatively unimportant. 109
All modern
theories of the firm assume (often implicitly) that at least some capital
assets are heterogenous, so that all assets are not equally valuable in all
uses. 110
Capital
assets are subjective, individual production plans, plans that are formulated
and continually revised by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Capital goods should
thus be characterized, not by their physical properties, but by their place in
the structure of production as conceived by entrepreneurs. The actual place of
any capital good in the time sequence of production is given by the market for
capital goods, in which entrepreneurs bid for factors of production in
anticipation of future consumer demands. This subjectivist, entrepreneurial
approach to capital assets is particularly congenial to theories of the firm
that focus on entrepreneurship and the ownership of assets. 115
Understanding
of capital as a complex structure. 115
The
real-world entrepreneurship consists primarily of choosing among combinations
of capital assets. The entrepreneur’s function is to specify and make decisions
on the concrete form the capital resources shall have. He specifies and
modifies the layout of his plant. As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of
capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also remain hidden.
(Lachmann, 1956,16) 117
Property-rights
theorist often highlight that most assets have multiple attributes (Coase,
1960; Cheung, 1970; Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1988a), including the different
functionalities and services or uses (Penrose, 1959) that the resources can
offer. 117
Heterogeneity
is an endogenous outcome of entrepreneurial activities. 118
Demsetz
argues that the notion of “full private ownership” over assets is “vague”, and
must always remain so, because there is an infinity of potential rights of
actions that can be owned. It is impossible to describe the complete set of
rights that are potentially ownable (Demsetz, 1988b, 19). Thus, most assets
have unspecified, not-yet-discovered attributes. An important function of
entrepreneurship is to create or discover these attributes. In fact,
entrepreneurship creates (contra Demsetz) a distinct role for asset ownership,
that is, for holding title to a bundle of existing attributes as well as to
future attributes. Specifically, ownership is a low-cost means of allocating
the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by the entrepreneur-owner.
119
Ownership
simplifies the process of entrepreneurial arbitrage – and hence helps to close
pockets of ignorance in the market – by allowing entrepreneurs to acquire, in
one transaction, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e. a distinct asset). 120
Austrian
idea of heterogeneous capital is a natural complement to the theory of
entrepreneurship and it connects naturally to ideas on heterogeneous assets in
property-rights economics. Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new
attributes of capital assets will want ownership titles to the relevant assets,
both for speculative reasons and for reasons of economizing on transaction
costs. 129
To explain
boundaries, one must presuppose that contracts are incomplete, for otherwise
everything can be stipulated contractually and there is no need for ownership,
understood as the “residual right” to make decisions that are not specified by
contracts. 141
From an
entrepreneurial perspective, the firm emerges as the entrepreneur’s means of
maximizing the returns from his judgment. 164
Entrepreneurs
are those individuals who undertake investments with unevaluatable risks. These
risks are therefore uninsurable. The entrepreneur believes he is right, while
everyone else is wrong. Thus the essence of entrepreneurship is being different
because one has a different perception of the situation. Entrepreneurship
reveals to the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed,
needed at all. 165
The best
time and place to use an asset depend on the specification of the uses of all
other assets that are needed in production (Hayek, 1941) 171
In a world
of heterogeneous assets with attributes that are costly to measure and foresee,
complete contracts cannot be drafted. 173
The primary
way to secure prospective entrepreneurial rewards, according to the new
property-rights approach, is to acquire ownership rights of complementary
resources. 178
Mises
claims that efficient resource allocation in a market economy requires
well-functioning asset markets. To have such markets, factors of production
must be privately owned. 182
Entrepreneurial
judgment is manifest in ownership. 191
Even the
most passive owners must choose someone to manage the asset. 194
The
ultimate decision concerning the use of their property and the choice of the
men to manage it must therefore be made by the owners and by no one else.
(Rothbard, 1962, 538) 195
All
entrepreneurial activity is socially beneficial (e.g. Mises, 1949; Kirzner,
1973; Yonekura and Lynskey, 2002; Shane 2003). Baumol (1990) points out that
entrepreneurship may be socially harmful. 197
One should
own those assets that are complementary to one’s (non-contractible) human
capital investments, since this increases (ex post) bargaining power and
therefore the rents that may be expected from investments. (Hart, 1995) 209
There is a
general tendency for ownership of complementary assets to move to the knowledge
source (rather than the other way around), because knowledge is harder to trade
than most other resources. (Foss, 1993a; Casson, 1997) 210
Ownership
facilitates the use of entrepreneurial judgment in a productive venture by
conferring the right to define contractual constraints may also be argued from
a property-rights perspective. 210
The
allocation of ownership is not just a matter of “getting the investment
incentives right”; it is also a matter of reducing the transaction costs of the
experimental process, by allocating authority via allocation of ownership
rights. Moreover, ownership has a speculative dimension (i.e. an entrepreneur
may acquire ownership over assets because he thinks they are more valuable in
combination with other assets, including his own judgment) that is missing in
the established theories of economic organization, but comes into the forefront
in an entrepreneurial perspective. 236
Capital is
not a factor or production per se, but an intrinsic aspect of the function of
entrepreneurial ownership and control. Judgment and finance are inextricably
linked. 237
Judgment is
the act of owning and controlling productive resources under conditions of
uncertainty and, therefore, not a resource itself. 237
The main
function of capital markets, after all, is not to moderate the total amount of
financial capital, but to allocate capital across activities. 243
It is
critically important to avoid public policies that generate malinvestment in
the first place. The fastest way to economic recovery is to liquidate the bad
investments as quickly as possible. 247