keskiviikko 20. heinäkuuta 2011

Ludwig von Mises on Public Debts

In the middle of a financial crisis caused by public debts, I was shocked to read Ludwig von Mises' Human Action and what von Mises says about public debts. Here is one chapter, which couldn't fit better in this situation. The best thing is that this text was published in 1949.

The Root of the Stabilization Idea

Economic calculation does not require monetary stability in the sense in which this term is used by the champions of the stabilization movement. The fact that rigidity in the monetary unit's purchasing power is unthinkable and unrealizable does not impair the methods of economic calculations. What economic calculation requires is a monetary system whose functioning is not sabotaged by government interference. The endeavors to expand the quantity of money in circulation either in order to increase the government's capacity to spend or in order to bring about a temporary lowering of the rate of interest disintegrate all currency matters and derange economic calculation. The first aim of monetary policy must be to prevent governments from embarking upon inflation and from creating conditions which encourage credit expansion on the part of banks. But this program is very different from the confused and self-contradictory program of stabilizing purchasing power.

Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action (1949)

For the sake of economic calculation all that is needed is to avoid great and abrupt fluctuations in the supply of money. Gold and, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, silver served very well all the purposes of economic calculation. Changes in the relation between the supply of and the demand for the precious metals and the resulting alterations in purchasing power went on so slowly that the entrepreneur's economic calculation could disregard them without going too far afield. Precision is unattainable in economic calculation quite apart from the shortcomings emanating from not paying due consideration to monetary changes. The planning businessman cannot help employing data concerning the unknown future; he deals with future prices and future costs of production. Accounting and bookkeeping in their endeavors to establish the result of past action are in the same position as far as they rely upon the estimation of fixed equipment, inventories, and receivables. In spite of all these uncertainties economic calculation can achieve its tasks. For these uncertainties do not stem from deficiencies of the system of calculation. They are inherent in the essence of acting that always deals with uncertain future.

The idea of rendering purchasing power stable did not originate from endeavors to make economic calculation more correct. Its source is the wish to create a sphere withdrawn from the ceaseless flux of human affairs, a realm which the historical process does not affect. Endowments which were designed to provide in perpetuity for an ecclesiastic body, for a charitable institution, or for a family were long established in land or in disbursement of agricultural products of kind. Later annuities to be settled in money were added. Endowers and beneficiaries expected that an annuity determined in terms of a definite amount of precious metals would not be affected by changes in economic conditions. But these hopes were illusionary. Later generations learned that the plans of their ancestors were not realized. Stimulated by this experience they began to investigate how the aims sought could be attained. Thus they embarked upon attempts to measure changes in purchasing power and to eliminate such changes.

The problem assumed much greater importance when governments initiated their policies of long-term irredeemable and perpetual loans. The state, this new deity of the dawning age of statolatry, this eternal and superhuman institution beyond the reach of earthly frailties, offered to the citizen an opportunity to put his wealth in safety and to enjoy stable income secure against vicissitudes. It opened a way to free the individual from the necessity of risking and acquiring his wealth and his income anew each day in the capitalist market. He who invested his funds in bonds issued by the government and its subdivisions was no longer subject to the inescapable laws of the market and to the sovereignty of the consumers. He was no longer under the necessity of investing his funds in such a way that they would best serve the wants and needs of the consumers. He was secure, he was safeguarded against the dangers of the competitive market in which losses are the penalty of inefficiency; the eternal state had taken him under its wing and guaranteed him the undistributed enjoyment of his funds. Henceforth his income no longer stemmed from the process of supplying the wants of the consumers in the best possible way, but from the taxes levied by the state's apparatus of compulsion and coercion. He was no longer a servant of his fellow citizens, subject to their sovereignty; he was a partner of the government which ruled the people and exacted tribute from them. What the government was far outweighed by the unquestionable solvency of the debtor, the state whose revenue did not depend on satisfying the public, but insisting on the payment of taxes.

In spite of the unpleasant experiences with public debts in earlier days, people were ready to trust freely the modernized state of nineteenth century. It was generally assumed that this new state would scrupulously meet its voluntary contracted obligations. Capitalists and entrepreneurs were fully aware of the fact that in the market society there is no means of preserving acquired wealth other than by acquiring it anew each day in tough competition with everybody, with already existing firms as well as with newcomers "operating on a shoe string". The entrepreneur, grown old and weary and no longer prepared to risk his hard-earned wealth by new attempts to meet the wants of consumers, and the heir of other people's profits, lazy and fully conscious of his own inefficiency, preferred investment in bonds of the public debt because they wanted to be free from the law of the market.

Now, the irredeemable perpetual public debt presupposes the stability of purchasing power. Although the state and its compulsion may be eternal, the interest paid on the public debt could be eternal only if based on a standard of unchanging value. In this form the investor who for security's sake shuns the market, entrepreneurship, and investment in free enterprise and prefers government bonds is faced again with the problem of the changeability of all human affairs. He discovers that in the frame of a market society there is no room left for wealth not dependent upon the market. His endeavors to find an inexhaustible source of income fail.

There are in this world no such things as stability and security and no human endeavors are powerful enough to bring them about. There is in the social system of the market society no other means of acquiring wealth and of preserving it than successful service to the consumers. The state is, of course, in a position to exact payments from its subjects and to borrow funds. However, even the most ruthless government in the long run is not able to defy the laws determining human life and action. If the government uses the sums borrowed for investment in those lines in which they best serve the wants of consumers, and if it succeeds in these entrepreneurial activities in free and equal competition with all private entrepreneurs, it is in the same position as any other businessman; it can pay interest because it has surpluses. But if the government invests funds unsuccessfully and no surplus results, or if it spends the money for current expenditure, the capital borrowed shrinks or disappears entirely, and no source is opened from which interest and principal could be paid. Then taxing the people is the only method available for complying with the articles of the credit contract. In asking taxes for such payments the government makes the citizens answerable for money squandered in the past. The taxes paid are not compensated by any present service rendered by the government's apparatus. The government pays interest on capital which has been consumed and no longer exists. The treasury is burdened with unfortunate results of past policies.

A good case can be made out of short-term government debts under special condition. Of course, the popular justification of war loans is nonsensical. All the materials needed for the conduct of a war must be provided by restriction of civilian consumption, by using up a part of the capital available and by working harder. The whole burden of warring falls upon the living generation. The coming generations are only affected to the extent to which, on account of the war expenditure, they will inherit less from those now living than they would have if no war had been fought. Financing a war through loans does not shift the burden among the citizens. If the whole expenditure had to be provided by taxes, only those who have liquid funds could be approached. Short-term loans can be instrumental in removing such inequalities as they allow for a fair assessment on the owners of fixed capital.

The long-term public and semipublic credit is a foreign and distributing element in the structure of a market society. Its establishment was a futile attempt to go beyond the limits of human action and to create an orbit of security and eternity removed from the transitoriness and instability of earthly affairs. What an arrogant presumption to borrow and to lend money for ever and ever, to make contracts for eternity, to stipulate for all times to come! In this respect it mattered little whether the loans were in a formal manner made irredeemable or not; intentionally and practically they were as a rule considered and dealt with such. In the heyday of liberalism some Western nations really retired parts of their long-term debt by honest reimbursement. But for the most part new debts were only heaped upon old ones. The financial history of the last century shows a steady increase in the amount of public indebtedness. Nobody believes that the states will eternally drag the burden of these interest payments. It is obvious that sooner or later all these debts will be liquidated in some way or other, but certainly not by payment of interest and principal according to the contract. A host of sophisticated writers are already busy elaborating the moral palliation for the day of final settlement.

The fact that economic calculation in terms of money is unequal to the tasks which are assigned to it in these illusory schemes for establishment of an unrealizable realm of calm removed from the inescapable limitations of human action and providing eternal security cannot be called a deficiency. There is no such things as eternal, absolute, and unchanging values. The search for such a values is vain. Economic calculation is not imperfect because it does not correspond to the confused ideas of people yearning for a stable income not dependent on the productive processes of men.

Source: Ludwig von Mises. Human Action. The Root of the Stabilization Idea. 225-229.

2 kommenttia:

  1. Erittäin tärkeä kirjoitus jälleen! Misesin ihmisläheinen talouskatsomus ei ole vielä tarpeeksi tunnettu.

    Uusklassisessa taloustieteen oppikirjassa, jota Suomessa käytetään laajalti, havainnollistetaan valuuttamalleja kolmiolla, josta vain yhden sivun voi valita kerrallaan. Kolmesta hyveestä vain kaksi voidaan saavuttaa. Vakaus, itsenäinen rahapolitiikka ja pääomaliikkeiden vapaus. Ennen kuin perehdyin paremmin itävaltalaiseen teoriaan, yritin sovittaa luonnollista valuuttaa tuohon kolmioon. Lukiessani Misesiä tajusin, että koko tuo kolmio lähtee erilaisista taustaoletuksista. Se on valtiojohtoinen. Sen mukaan valtio nähdään suunnittelijana, jolla oletetaan olevan kyky poistaa markkinoilta epävakautta ja edistää talouskehitystä säätelemällä rahan määrää. Tuota mallia Mises kutsuisi interventionismiksi.

    Luonnollinen hyödykeraha, josta ei enää uusklassisessa taloustieteessä puhuta, on väistämätön tulema, mikäli valuutan annetaan syntyä vapailla markkinoilla. Vaihdon välineellä täytyy olla ensin hyötyarvoa sekä vaihtoon soveltuvia ominaisuuksia. Tästä vasta seuraa arvostus vaihdon välineenä. Tätä ei pidä sekoittaa marxilaiseen käyttö- ja vaihtoarvoteoriaan, vaan valuutan konkreettinen arvo muodostuu kahdesta kuvitteellisesta komponentista.

    Koska nämä komponentit vaihtelevat, valuutta ei voi koskaan olla täysin saman arvoinen. Se, että valtio luo valuutan, ei poista tuota ongelmaa. Valtio ei voi päättää ihmisten puolesta, paljonko he arvostavat mitäkin. Ongelmat siirtyvät vain muille elämänalueille. Täytyy myös ymmärtää omistusoikeuden merkitys. Jos valtio luo valuutan, joka on pelkkää paperia, ihmisen valuuttamuotoinen omaisuus ei ole konkreettista, vaan altista valtion yhteiskuntapolitiikalle (mielivallalle).

    Vapaasti kelluva keskuspankkijohtoinen valuutta on osittain tahrannut markkinatalouden mainetta, sillä uusklassinen kapea diskurssi on tehnyt siitä "vapaimman" vaihtoehdon. Tämä pätee korkeintaan uusklassisessa kehyksessä.

  2. Thomas, kiitos kattavasta kommentistasi. Rahan, valuutan ja valtion velan syvällinen ymmärtäminen ei ole kovin yleistä ja itsekin on tullut vanhoja oppikirjoja kyseenalaistettua sen jälkeen kun olen tutustunut Misesin tuotantoon.


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